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BUT REVEREND, WHY DOES YOUR BAPTISMAL FONT
HAVE A DIVING BOARD?
EQUITABLE TREATMENT FOR VOWS OF POVERTY
UNDER THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
J. TimOTHY PHIUnPps*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) issued a revenue
ruling' that drastically changed its position concerning the imposition of
federal income tax on members of traditional bona fide religious orders
who have taken a vow of poverty. Under these vows a member of the order
renounces all wealth and promises to give any income to the religious order.
The position taken in the ruling (and maintained by the IRS in subsequent
litigation) is essentially two-fold. First the IRS concedes that income earned
by a member of a religious order2 on account of services performed directly
for the order or for the church (or a related entity) with which the order
is affiliated and given to the order in conformity with the member's vow
of poverty is not includible in the member's income. In such situations the
IRS treats the member as having earned the income as an agent of the
order, 4 continuing the IRS' pre-1977 policy regarding services performed
directly for the order, church, or affiliated entities. Second, however, the
IRS contends that if the member performs services for an employer not
affiliated with the order's church, the member must include any income
received for the services in the member's own gross income, even though
all the income is remitted to the order in conformity with the member's
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University; B.S. 1962, Wheeling College;
J.D. 1965, Georgetown University; L.L.M. 1966, Harvard University. The author wishes to
thank Adam Elfenbein, J.D. 1986, Washington and Lee University School of Law, who
contributed substantially to the completion of this article. The author expresses his appreciation
to the Frances Lewis Law Center for its grant supporting the research for this article.
1. Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26 [hereinafter Rev. Rul. 77-290].
2. A member of a religious order will sometimes be referred to in this article as a
"religious."
3. See Rev. Rul 77-290, supra note 1, at 26. The ruling warns, however, that the income
may be taxable to the order as unrelated business taxable income, even though the order
qualifies as a tax exempt organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See I.R.C. §§ 511-13. All
Internal Revenue Code citations in this article are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 unless
otherwise indicated.
4. Rev. Rul. 77-290, supra note 1, at 27.
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vow of poverty,5 reversing the IRS' pre-1977 policy. The Service, neverthe-
less, has conceded that the member may be entitled to a charitable deduction
(subject to the usual limitations) for amounts turned over to the order. 6
The Service's reversal of position has been aggressively developed for
approximately the last ten years. The IRS previously had been quiescent
on the issue of taxing members of religious orders.7 The result of the IRS'
post-1977 policy has been that earnings of members of religious orders
working on missions related to their religious ministries have become subject
to federal income taxation in situations not previously covered by the federal
income tax. Reported cases imposing taxes have included a priest working
as a chaplairi in a secular hospital,' a nun performing nursing services in a
charitable medical clinic, 9 a nun working as a para-legal in a legal-aid
clinic, 10 a nun working as a counselor and physical therapist at a research
and medical center," a nun working as a librarian in a public library, 12 a
nun working as a secretary and counsellor in an alcoholic rehabilitation
clinic,' 3 a chaplain at a state hospital for the mentally disabled, 4 and a
priest teaching in the Religious Studies Department of a state university. 5
Undoubtedly, many similar situations have occurred in which the imposition
of tax on the individual religious has not been contested.'
6
The abrupt change in IRS policy during the 1970s was unfair from a
policy standpoint and at least questionable from a legal standpoint. This
article first discusses the history and background of taxing religious order
5. See id. In Revenue Ruling 77-290, the Service held that a member of a religious
order under a bona fide vow of poverty who took a position as an attorney with a private
law firm had to include compensation received from the firm and turned over to the member's
order. In contrast, a religious who worked directly for her church business office as a secretary
did not have to include amounts received on account of those services and turned over to the
order.
6. Rev. Rul. 77-436, 1977-2 C.B. 25, 26; Rev. Rul. 76-323, 1976-2 C.B. 18, 19. The amount
of the deduction normally would be limited by I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) to 50% of the member's
adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(A). Moreover, the Service has taken the position
in at least one letter ruling that the amount of the contribution must be reduced by any amounts
the member receives from the order for living expenses. See Priv. Ltr. Rul 8-104-011, reprinted
in 11 FED. TAXEs (P-H) 55029 (1981). The ruling is unclear about whether the IRS would include
in this reduction the value of goods and services received in kind such as meals and lodging
taken in a convent. Id.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 23-35 (discussing Service's vow of poverty policy
prior to Rev. Rul. 77-290).
8. Hogan v. United States, 57 A.F.T.R.2d 86-338 (D. Me. 1985).
9. Schuster v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 764 (1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986).
10. Luechtefeld v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,227 (1985).
11. Young v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,228 (1985).
12. Laurent v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,229 (1985).
13. Woltering v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,230 (1985).
14. McEneany v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,413 (1986).
15. Fogarty v. United States, 55 A.F.T.R.2d 85-416, 6 Cl. Ct. 612 (1984), aff'd, 780
F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
16. Informal discussion with members of religious orders indicates that some orders have
simply chosen not to contest the issue.
VOWS OF POVERTY
members and analyzes the most prominent litigated cases. Finally, this
article makes suggestions about how the courts or Congress might better
resolve the issue.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Vows of poverty, as expressions of religious faith, have long been
entrenched in the Western tradition. 7 Members of Roman Catholic Church
religious orders traditionally have taken vows of poverty, obedience, and
chastity, requiring them to renounce worldly goods, give unquestioning
obedience to their religious superiors, and practice sexual abstinence. 8 In
the Roman Catholic Church religious order members may be nuns, brothers,
or ordained priests.
Contrary to a popular misconception, not all ordained priests are
members of a religious order who take the traditional vows of poverty,
obedience, and chastity. Most ordained priests are so-called "diocesan"
priests who perform services for and receive compensation from the diocese
in which they are located. The Catholic Church regards the compensation
as the priests' to keep and do with as they see fit. The priests are classified
as independent contractors for federal tax purposes.' 9 The priests pay federal
and state income taxes on compensation received from the diocese and
whatever other income they receive. 20
By contrast, the Catholic Church does not consider priests who are
members of religious orders to receive compensation in their own right, but
rather on behalf of their religious order. These priests are under a religious
obligation to give the order any compensation they receive. 2' Nuns and
brothers n are under a similar obligation.
17. See generally SACRAMENTUM MuNDi 67-70 (K. Rahner ed. 1970) (discussing religious
orders); 12 NEw CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 287-93 (McGraw-Hill 1967) (discussing religious
life).
18. See generally CODE OF CANON LAW, Part III, Institutes of Consecrated Life and
Societies of Apostolic Faith (A. Mitchell trans. 1983) [hereinafter CODE OF CANON LAW].
19. See Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems,
45 FoRIsm L. REv. 885, 889 n.2 (1977).
20. Diocesan priests also usually are subject to the social security self-employment tax,
although they may, on a one shot basis, elect out of the social security system if they are
conscientiously opposed to participation in national insurance programs or opposed to such
programs because of their religious principles. See I.R.C. § 1402(e); Blakeley v. Commissioner,
720 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1983). In addition Diocesan priests often receive their lodging tax-free.
See I.R.C. § 107.
21. See CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 15, at Canon 668. Canon 668 provides:
Can. 668 § 1 Before their first profession, members are to cede the administration
of their goods to whomsoever they wish and, unless the constitutions provide
otherwise, they are freely to make dispositions concerning the use and enjoyment of
these goods. At least before perpetual profession, they are to make a will which is
valid also in civil aw.
§ 2 To change these dispositions for a just reason, and to take any action concerning
temporal goods, there is required the permission of the Superior who is competent
1987]
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A. O.D. 119
The Service's original, and for nearly 50 years only, official public
pronouncement on the vow of poverty issue, O.D. 119, 21 was published in
1919. O.D. 119 provided in its entirety:
A clergyman is not liable for any income tax on the amount
received by him during the year from the parish of which he is in
charge, provided that he turns over to the religious order of which
he is a member, all the money received in excess of his actual living
expenses, on account of the vow of poverty which he has taken.
Members of religious orders are subject to tax upon taxable
income, if any, received by them individually, but are not subject
to tax on income received by them merely as agents of the orders
of which they are members.24
In practice, the Service applied this ruling to exclude from gross income
amounts paid to a religious order member and turned over to the order in
accordance with that member's vow of poverty.25 The lack of any reported
litigation on this issue until the 1970s suggests that the Service adhered to
its O.D. 119 policy of excluding from the religious' gross income amounts
turned over to a religious order. In fact, the Service reaffirmed this position
in a 1944 letter issued pursuant to General Counsel Memorandum 24,316.26
in accordance with the institute's own law.
§ 3 Whatever a religious acquires by personal labour, or on behalf of the institute,
belongs to the [order]. Whatever comes to a religious in any way through pension,
grant or insurance also passes to the institute, unless the institute's own law decrees
otherwise.
§ 4 When the nature of an [order] requires members to renounce their goods
totally, this renunciation is to be made before perpetual profession and, as far as
possible, in a form that is valid also in civil law; it shall come into effect from the
day of profession. The same procedure is to be followed by a perpetually professed
religious who, in accordance with the norms of the [order's] own law and with the
permission of the supreme Moderator, wishes to renounce goods, in whole or in
part.
§ 5 Professed religious who, because of the nature of their [order], totally renounce
their goods, lose the capacity to acquire and possess goods; actions of theirs contrary
to the vow of poverty are therefore invalid. Whatever they acquire after renunciation
belongs to the [order], in accordance with the [order's] own law.
Id.
22. Brothers are male religious order members who are not ordained priests, for example
the Christian Brothers.
23. 1 C.B. 82 (1919). In 1919 the Internal Revenue Service was officially titled the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. To avoid awkwardness of expression this article will in all
instances refer to the IRS by its present official name.
24. Id.
25. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-04-005, reprinted in 1981 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 55,029 (1981
private letter rulings); Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,316 (1944); Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at
15 and app. B-427, Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986).
26. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,316 (1944).
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That letter, apparently issued to a Roman Catholic organization, stated that
the issue was "tax liability of members of religious orders who are subject
to vows of poverty . .. who individually perform services under circum-
stances resulting in compensation being paid for such service by organiza-
tions other than the religious order of which they are members." 27 The
ruling concluded that "in such circumstances" the member is "merely an
agent, trustee, or conduit for transmission of the money received to the
order." 8 Therefore "moneys received" by the member "under such circum-
stances is not income. ' 29 Moreover, the letter explicitly stated that this
conclusion was in conformity with O.D. 119.30 The Service clearly was
applying the gross income exclusion of O.D. 119 very broadly. Just as
clearly, members of bona fide religious orders relied on this interpretation
over the many years following the publication of O.D. 119.
3 1
The reliance by members of bona fide religious orders on the Service's
broad interpretation of O.D. 119's gross income exclusion was buttressed
in 1968 when the Service published a second ruling dealing with vows of
poverty.3 2 The taxpayer in that ruling was a registered nurse who also was
a member of a religious order exempt from tax under IRC § 501(c)(3). The
specific issue was the includability of amounts the taxpayer received from
a hospital for whom the taxpayer worked. The ruling stated that all
compensation earned by the taxpayer was placed in the Order's treasury and
that the taxpayer had no right to direct any disposition of the Order's funds.
The details of the taxpayer's daily activities were under the supervision of
the hospital. The Order, however, "made all arrangements for taxpayer's.
assignment to the hospital," and the taxpayer remained under the Order's
"general direction and control." ' 3
The Order requested that the taxpayer's checks be paid directly to it,
but the hospital instead issued the checks to the taxpayer who, in turn endorsed
them over to the Order. The ruling did not mention whether the hospital
was controlled by the Order, an affiliated church, or some outside organiza-
tion. The Service concluded:
It is apparent that taxpayer was performing services for the hospital
as agent of the [Order], since at all times she remained under its
general direction and control. Because of this relationship she had
no right to receive or direct the use or disposition of the checks
issued to her by the hospital for her own benefit.3 4
27. Id.; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at app. B-429; Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d
672 (7th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Schuster Brief].
28. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,316 (1944); Schuster Brief, supra note 27, at app. B-430.
29. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,316 (1944); Schuster Brief, supra note 27, at app. B-430.
30. Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,316 (1944); Schuster Brief, supra note 27, at app. B-430.
31. Informal discussions with members of religious orders indicate uniformly that they
relied on this interpretation to exclude such compensation from their income.
32. Rev. Rul. 68-123, 1968-1 C.B. 35, clarified by Rev. Rul. 83-127, 1983-2 C.B. 125.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 36.
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Consequently, the compensation was not includable in the taxpayer's gross
income.3 5 At the advent of the 1970s, therefore, the Service in both its
published pronouncements and actual practice had never contested exclusion
from gross income of amounts received by members of religious orders who
turned such receipts over to their orders in accordance with bona fide vows
of poverty.
B. Mail Order Churches
In the 1970s the IRS became seriously concerned with a phenomenon
popularly known as the "illegal tax protester movement. ' 36 The Service
defines a tax protester as "a person who advocates and/or participates in
a scheme with a broad exposure that results in an illegal underpayment of
taxes." '37 Although the movement was not new,3" it was during the 1970s
that the problem began to proliferate and become widespread. 9
Tax protester schemes take many forms. 40 The scheme relevant to this
discussion involves the creation of bogus churches to avoid payment of taxes.
41
35. Id.
36. See generally IRS Response to Illegal Tax Protester Movement, Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on
Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) [hereinafter IRS Response].
37. Id. at 2, 129.
38. Id. at 131. The tax protester movement began during the 1920s in the West and
Southwest. Id.
39. Id. at 34, 131.
40. See id. at 131-32. The Service has broken down such schemes into several categories:
1. Constitutional Basis-Refusal to include tax return information on return because
of a claim of constitutional rights, e.g., the fifth amendment;
2. Fair Market Value-Reduces gross income because of declining value of dollar;
3. Gold/Silver Standard-Claims that only gold or silver currency can be taxed;
4. Blank Form 1040-Generally only the taxpayer's name and address, and possibly
signature, and Form W-2 attached, is given;
5. Nonpayment Protest-Nonpayment or under payment of tax because of protest
return;
6. Church-Related-Taxpayer receives income from nonreligious sources and declares
that it is nontaxable because of vow of poverty or claims a charitable deduction
for amounts claimed to be given to a self-created church;
7. Protest Adjustment-The return contains specific unallowable items identified
to protest;
8. W-4/W-4E-Excessive Overstatement of Exemption or Claim of Tax Exempt
Status-To avoid withholding of taxes;
9. Family Estate Trust-Taxpayer creates a trust which he controls, turns assets
and assigns income to it, and claims he is not taxable on the trust income even
though it is used to pay his personal living expenses;
10. Other-Miscellaneous schemes and correspondence (e.g., cards, letters).
See id.
41. See Note, Mail Order Ministries, The Religious Purpose Exemption and the Consti-
tution, 33 TAx LAw. 959 (1980) (extensive discussion of church related schemes) [hereinafter
Mail Order Ministries].
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This scheme (or scam) actually has two distinct approaches. Under one
approach an individual taxpayer forms a branch of a "church," usually by
obtaining forms and credentials from a mail-order purveyor of such items.
At the same time, the individual becomes a minister of the "church" and
"contributes" his residence and a percentage of his income to the "church."
The church in turn provides benefits such as lodging in the residence,
automobiles, and vacations disguised as religious retreats. The taxpayer
claims a charitable deduction for his contribution to the "church" and a
section 107 "parsonage" exclusion for his lodging.42 He also claims that
expense for use of the automobile and vacations are not includable in gross
income because he incurs the expenses while carrying on church activities.
43
Under this scheme the individual's purported tax benefits usually will be
circumscribed by the 50 percent maximum charitable contribution limita-
tion.44
A second approach that promises even greater tax benefits is the bogus
vow of poverty. Under the bogus vow of poverty approach, the taxpayer
forms a branch of a church and takes a "vow of poverty," usually by a
preprinted form provided by the "mother church. ' 45 The taxpayer then
assigns all his assets and his income to the "church" or his own "religious
order" which he, of course, controls. His house becomes a "monastery,"
his recreation room a "chapel," and his swimming pool a "baptismal font."
He claims that his income is not taxable to him because, on account of the
"vow of poverty," the church or order, not he, is entitled to the income.4 6
An illustrative recent example of this kind of scheme is United States
v. Ebner,47 a criminal tax fraud case. In Ebner the taxpayers were ap-
proached by a disbarred lawyer who was national head and "Archbishop"
of the Life Science Church (LSC). The "Archbishop" told the taxpayers
that the principal belief of LSC was that Americans were overtaxed and
had the right to choose not to pay taxes. 48 The "Archbishop" offered to
sell the taxpayers a "bishopship" that would enable them to sell "ministries"
to the public for $3000 each. The taxpayers would keep $2500 and transfer
the remaining $500 to the "Archbishop." The "Archbishop," in turn,
42. I.R.C. § 107. Section 107 provides:
In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not include-
(1) the rental -value of a home furnished to him as part of his compensation;
or
(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the extent
used by him to rent or provide a home.
Id.
43. IRS Response, supra note 36, at 137-38; Mail Order Ministries, supra note 41, at
960.
44. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A).
45. See, e.g., Shadduck v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,265, at 85-1167 n.2
(1985).
46. See IRS Response, supra note 36, at 138.
47. 782 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1986).
48. Id. at 1122.
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would supply a set of minister's credentials. The new "ministers" would
then recruit other new ministers. The taxpayers all took "vows of poverty,"
each assigning his assets and income to his own personal church. In the
words of the Ebner court:
The "minister" would close all of his personal bank accounts
and open at least one checking account in the name of his church,
over which the "minister" would exercise full control. The "min-
ister's" personal expenses, which often included luxury items such
as cars, boats, or, in [one taxpayers'] case, a "baptismal" (swimming)
pool in his backyard, were paid out of church funds and were
characterized for tax purposes as authorized expenses of a tax-exempt
"church" for the support of its "minister" and to fulfill the
"church's" religious and charitable purposes.
49
One of the taxpayers told a colleague that he was going ahead with the
scheme because this "might be his last chance to be a millionaire." 5 0
The taxpayers stopped paying taxes on the basis of their vows of
poverty. Over the tax years in question one taxpayer had earned about $1.7
million, another $650,000 and another $590,000. The taxpayers earned most
of their income from the sale of "ministries." The taxpayers "used'church'
funds to pay for Cadillacs, ocean front homes, and boats, and also to
establish bank accounts in other countries." ' 5' The taxpayers' criminal fraud
conviction was upheld by the circuit court, which characterized the churches
as "bogus" and the vows of poverty as "sham[s." '5 2
Although the Ebner case is particularly egregious, it is by no means
unique. As Judge Kaufman has said:
Every year, with renewed vigor, many citizens seek sanctuary
in the free exercise clause of the first amendment. They desire
salvation not from sin or from temptation, however, but from the
most earthly of mortal duties-income taxes. 3
Literally a parade of cases exist in which taxpayers have blatantly used the
guise of a church to evade taxes.1
4
49. Id. at 1123.
50. Id. at 1122-23 n.2.
51. Id. at 1124.
52. Id. at 1122.
53. Mone v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1985).
54. See Pollard v. Commissioner, 786 F.2d 1063 (lth Cir. 1986). For example, in
Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am., the court found that the "church" was operated for
the substantial non-exempt purpose of avoiding the payment of Federal income taxes. Included
in the church's literature was the statement, "Run your business with business-like finesse,
and you'll never be the business of the IRS." Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am., 80 T.C.
833 (1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1984). In Solander v. Commissioner the taxpayer
named his branch of the Universal Life Church "Old Saint Lucifer's," presumably in honor
of the devil. Solander v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 182,161 (1982). In Carr Enterprises,
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The IRS properly has been concerned with the proliferation of church
related tax protester schemes. The IRS has had difficulty, however, with
the sensitive first amendment problems associated with challenging an alleged
church.-s The Service has attempted to avoid these first amendment problems
by bypassing the question of whether the alleged church or religion is bona-
fide . 6 The IRS has maintained a policy of trying to treat all church-related
Inc. v. United States the taxpayer testified that both before and after he was ordained as a
minister in his "church" he was a practicing Roman Catholic. Carr Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States, 698 F.2d 952, 953 (8th Cir. 1983). In Kitcher v. Commissioner the taxpayer formed
his branch of the Freedom Church of Revelation and became a minister for the avowed
purpose of becoming exempt from income taxation. Kitcher v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-
H) 86,041 (1986). The court characterized the taxpayer's actions as "blatant tax avoidance"
and "pie-in-the-sky." Id. In Stephenson v. Commissioner the Court said that the taxpayers had
engaged in "a transparent attempt 'to transmute the commercial into the ecclesiastical.' "
Stephenson v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting McGahen v. Commis-
sioner, 76 T.C. 480 (1981)). In Basic Bible Church v. Commissioner the court found that the
"church" was formed for "the purpose of confounding tax collection." Basic Bible Church
v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 265, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1984). In Manson v. Commissioner the court
found that the taxpayer "used [the church] primarily as his incorporated pocketbook" and
that "[t]he primary purpose for [the church's] continued existence was to give colorable
justification for [taxpayer's] attempt to insulate a substantial portion of his salesman's earnings
from taxation." Manson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 180,315 (1980). In Pusch v.
Commissioner the taxpayer at least had a motive other than personal tax avoidance. Pusch v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,004 (1980). He founded the Church of the Tolerants
because he believed tax exemptions for "bigot churches" are unconstitutional. Id. Therefore,
he claimed exemption for himself in order to test the constitutionality of the exemption. Id.
In Speak-man v. Commissioner the court found that the taxpayer, a truck driver-minister, was
attempting to use the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion "as a sword to
evade payment of taxes, rather than as a shield permitting the free exercise of religion."
Speakman v. Commission, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,171, at 86-747 (1985) (quoting Wilcox v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,243, at 85-1062 (1985)). In United States v. Daly the
taxpayers used their churches' funds "to pay living expenses, to purchase furs, cars, planes,
boats, gold coins, and real estate, to invest, to maintain country club memberships and to
take foreign ski trips." United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1985). There was
sufficient evidence to find their vows of poverty to be "bad faith shams." Id. In Lynch v.
Commissioner the taxpayer remained a Roman Catholic after becoming a minister in his
church. The Court found his vow of poverty to be a sham. Lynch v. Commissioner, 49
T.C.M. (P-H) 80,464 (1980).
55. See IRS Response, supra note 36, at 3 (statement of William J. Anderson, General
Accounting Office). William Anderson stated that
[i]n any event, though, this is the most difficult fo" IRS to cope with because of
first amendment concerns, trying to make that distinction between what is a legitimate
church and what is something else, whatever you would call it.
Id.
56. See IRS MANUAL, ExEMPT OROANZATMON HANDBooK 344.2(4). The IRS Exempt
Organization Handbook contains the following warning:
The Supreme Court has suggested that serious constitutional questions would be
presented if [section 501(c)(3)] were interpreted to exclude even those beliefs that do
not encompass a Supreme Being in the conventional sense....
Id. In Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States the court refused to question the validity
of the Universal Life Church as a religion: "Nor will the court praise or condemn a religion,
however excellent or fanatical or preposterous it might seem." Universal Life Church, Inc. v.
United States, 372 F. Supp. 770, 775 (E.D. Cal. 1974). Some observers believe that, in the
Burger Court's final years, the Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment to the
1987]
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cases based on norms that do not refer to the bona fides of the particular
religious claim.5 7 This policy has in turn led to a reversal of the former IRS
policy regarding traditional religious orders.58 The IRS formally announced
the reversal of its policy pertaining to traditional religious orders in Revenue
Ruling 77-2 90,
5
9 and the reversal has been implemented further by several
subsequent rulings.60
C. Bona Fide Vows of Poverty
The contrast of bona fide vows of poverty to mail order ministries is
exemplified in the case of Schuster v. Commissioner 1. 6  The taxpayer in
Schuster, Sister Francine, was a nun in a Roman Catholic religious order
that had been incorporated in 1886 under Illinois law. The Order was exempt
from federal income tax under IRC § 501(c)(3). The Order's stated purposes
were
[t]o conduct schools and places of learning and to promote edu-
cation, to advance the cause of Religious and Social Work, to
conduct hospitals and institutions for the care and treatment of
suffering humanity and to do all and everything necessary or
convenient for the accomplishment of any of the purposes or objects
and powers above mentioned or incidental thereto.62
advantage of the majority religions at the expense of the minority religions. See, Teitele, The
Supreme Court's 1984-85 Church-State Decisions: Judicial Paths of Least Resistance, 21 HAv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 651 (1986).
57. See Whelan, supra note 19, at 927. There are two problems with refusing to analyze
the validity of a § 501(c)(3) religion. First, the term religion is the clear determining factor in
applying § 501(c)(3); ignoring this term is tantamount to the courts assuming the authority
of Congress. See 44 CONG. REc. 4151 (1909). Second, the federal courts have not shied away
from analyzing the validity of religions in other contexts, such as determining 50 U.S.C. §
456(J) Conscientious Objector (C.O.) status. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1970);
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1964). In
Seeger the statutory language required conscientious objection to be based upon "religious
training and belief" which refers to "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation." Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173. The court held
that a meaningful belief occupying the position of God fulfilled this requirement. Id. at 173-
80. In other words, the courts expanded the definition despite specific congressional statutory
language to the contrary. Welsh followed the same line of reasoning as Seeger and resulted in
a dramatic concurrence by Justice Harlan. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 344-67. Harlan concurred on
the basis of the doctrine of stare decisis. See id. at 345. The concurrence admits that the
decisions in both Seeger and Welsh impermissibly ignore statutory construction. Id. at 344-45.
Harlan continues by saying that since the statute clearly limits the exemption to theistic beliefs,
the court should decide whether the statute violates the first amendment. Id. at 345.
58. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing revenue rulings that reverse
IRS' pre-1977 policy regarding traditional religious orders).
59. 1977-2 C.B. 26. This reversal of policy had been foreshadowed in Rev. Rul. 76-323,
1976-2 C.B. 18. See Rev. Rul. 76-323, 1976-2 C.B. 18 (inclusion in income required where order
required all members to take purely secular jobs such as plumbing).
60. Rev. Rul. 84-13, 1984-1 C.B. 21; Rev. Rul. 81-267, 1981-2 C.B. 196; Rev. Rul. 80-332,
1980-2 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 79-132, 1979-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 78-229, 1978-1 C.B. 305.
61. 84 T.C. 764 (1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986).
62. Id. at 765.
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Roman Catholic canon law63 required Sister Francine, as a member of
the Order, to take vows of chastity,64 poverty, 6- and obedience. 66 Under her
vow of poverty, Sister Francine executed a "Declaration Concerning Re-
muneration" in which she agreed "never to claim any wages, compensation,
remuneration, or reward ... for the time or for the services or work that
[she] perform[ed] for ... [the Order]."
67
Members of the Roman Catholic Order were allowed to secure employ-
ment in occupations relating to the Order's purposes. Such employment,
termed a mission, had to be approved by the nun's Superiors.6 This approval
depended on whether the proposed mission related to "religious and char-
itable works that promote education, relieve suffering, and otherwise provide
assistance to those in need." 69 Each member of the Order who received a
mission was duty bound under her vow of obedience to perform the mission
and could not withdraw from it without permission from her Superiors. In
addition, each member was obligated to obey any orders of her Superiors
regarding the mission even to the point of withdrawing from the mission if
so ordered.
7 0
63. See CODE OF CANON LAW supra note 18, at Canon 598. Canon 598 provides:
Can. 598 § 1 Each [order], taking account of its own special character and purposes,
is to define in its constitutions the manner in which the evangelical counsels of
chastity, poverty and obedience are to be observed in its way of life.
§ 2 All members must not only observe the evangelical counsels faithfully and
fully, but also direct their lives according to the [order's] own law, and so strive
for the perfection of their state.
Id.
64. See CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 18, at Canon 599. Canon 599 provides:
Can. 599 The evangelical counsel of chastity embraced for the sake of the Kingdom
of heaven, is a sign of the world to come, and a source of greater fruitfulness in
an undivided heart. It involves the obligation of perfect continence observed in
celibacy.
Id.
65. See CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 18, at Canon 600. Canon 600 provides:
Can. 600 The evangelical counsel of poverty in imitation of Christ, who for our
sake was made poor when he was rich, entails a life which is poor in reality and in
spirit, sober and industrious, and a stranger to earthly riches. It also involves
dependence and limitation in the use and the disposition of goods, in accordance
with each [order's] own law.
Id.
66. See CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 18, at Canon 601. Canon 601 provides:
Can. 601 The evangelical counsel of obedience, undertaken in the spirit of faith and
love in the following of Christ, who was obedient even unto death, obliges submission
of one's will to lawful Superiors, who act in the place of God when they give
commands that are in accordance with each [order's] own constitutions.
Id.
67. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 765.
68. See CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 18, at Canon 671. Canon 671 provides:
Can. 671 Religious are not to undertake tasks and offices outside their own [order]
without the permission of the lawful Superior.
Id.
69. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 766.
70. Id. The order in Schuster had at times in the past required such a withdrawal.
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Under their vows of poverty, members of the Order were not entitled
to a return of any of the income generated by their mission work, but
rather the Order was entitled to it. Therefore, the Order required members
to remit to it all funds paid to members for work performed on a mission.,
If a member should withdraw from the Order, she had no right to demand
compensation for her work while a member of the Order." The Order,
however, might provide relocation and transition funds to the departing
member.
73
Taxpayer, Sister Francine, was a registered nurse. She was awarded a
traineeship for nurse-midwife training from the federal government. As a
condition of the grant Sister Francine agreed to practice in a "health
manpower shortage area" for a 12 month period for each academic year
of the traineeship.7 ' Sister Francine received permission from the Order to
interview for positions that would fulfill this requirement. Subsequently,
Sister Francine received word that a position was available for her at Su
Clinica Familiar, a family health services program under the auspices of
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Brownsville, Texas. 75
Sister Francine received permission from her Superior to accept this
position in furtherance of the Order's purposes to relieve suffering and
promote life. Pursuant to that permission, the Acting Provincial Adminis-
trator of the Order wrote a letter to the Director of Midwifery at Su Clinica
offering the services of Sister Francine on behalf of the Order. 76 Sister
71. Id. See CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 18, at Canon 668. Canon 668 provides
in pertinent part:
Can. 668 * * *
§ 3 Whatever a religious acquires by personal labor, or on behalf of the
[order] belongs to the [order]....
Id.
72. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 767. See CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 18, at Canon 702 §
1. Canon 702 provides in pertinent part:
Can. 702 § 1 Whoever lawfully leaves a religious [order] or is lawfully dismissed
from one, cannot claim anything from the [order] for any work done in it.
Id.
73. See CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 18, at Canon 702 § 2. Canon 702 provides in
pertinent part:
Can. 702 ***
§ 2 The [order], however, is to show equity and evangelical charity to the
member who is separated from it.
Id. In one recent instance the amount provided a departing member was $500. Schuster Brief,
supra note 27, at 6.
74. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 767-68.
75. Id. at 786 n.2 (Korner, J., dissenting); Schuster Brief, supra note 27, at 8.
76. Id. at 769. In Schuster the Acting Provincial Administrator for Sister Francine's
Order wrote a letter to the director of the nurse-midwifery service at Su Clinica Familiar in
which the Acting Provincial Administrator stated in pertinent part:
Sister Francine Schuster has informed us of your recent phone notification of a current
job opening in nurse midwifery at Su Clinica Familiar, Raymondville-Harlingen, Texas.
Harlingen, Texas.
The Community of Adorers of the Blood of Christ [the Order] would like to contract
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Francine was to receive an appointment from and be paid through the
National Health Services Corps (NHSC) that was providing funding for Su
Clinica at the time. Consequently, the Acting Provincial Administrator also
wrote to NHSC offering Sister Francine's services. This letter informed
NHSC of Sister Francine's status as a member of the Order and that she
would be acting under her vow of poverty as a member of the Order. 7 The
director of the midwifery clinic at Su Clinica, also a nun, responded by
accepting the offer and advising that Sister Francine simply endorse her
checks over to the Order.7 8 No record exists of any response from NHSC.
79
Sister Francine then became employed at the clinic as a nurse-midwife.
She lived at a convent house of the Sisters of Divine Providence. Her room
and board were paid by the Order. 0 She received a personal expense
allowance from the Order of no more than $35 per month, a standard
personal expense allowance of the Order. No relationship existed between
the amount of the allowance and the amount of Sister Francine's compen-
with you for the services of Sister Francine Schuster, ASC for the position of nurse-
midwife for one year at Su Clinica Familiar.
If our offer is acceptable, we request that payment for her services be made to the
Adorers of the Blood of Christ.
Id.
77. Id. at 769-70. In Schuster the Acting Provincial Administrator for Sister Francine's
Order sent a letter to the National Health Services Corps in which the Acting Provincial
Administrator stated in pertinent part:
Sister Francine Schuster has informed us of your recent phone notification of a
current job opening in nurse midwifery at Su Clinica Familiar, Raymondville-
Harlingen, Texas.
The Community of Adorers of the Blood of Christ would like to contract with you
for the services of Sister Francine Schuster, ASC for the position of nurse-midwife
for one year at Su Clinica Familiar.
If our offer is acceptable, we request that payment for her services be made to the
Adorers of the Blood of Christ.
[Sister Francine] is a member in good standing of [the Order] ... and is, there-
fore ... under vow of poverty ... her services are performed as part of the duties
required to be performed by the member for/or on behalf of the Order as its agent;
and . .. all salaries or grants received by her accrue to the ... [Order] because of
her vow of poverty.
Id.
78. Id. at 770. In Schuster the director of the nurse-midwifery service at the Su Clinica
Familiar sent the Acting Provincial Administrator for the Community of Adorers of the Blood
of Christ the following response to the Acting Provincial Administrator's offer of Sister
Francine's services:
Consider this letter as formal acceptance of Sister Francine Schuster on our nurse-
midwifery staff. She will be beginning on the pay period that starts July 23. Sister
Francine's checks will be paid to her and she can endorse them and send them to
you. I endorse my checks 'paid to the order of the Sisters of St. Mary. Sister Angela
Murdaugh.' There is no problem with them going through the mail like that.
Id.
79. Id.
80. Schuster Brief, supra note 27, at 8.
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sation for her clinic work.8 1 Compensation was paid by NHSC directly to
Sister Francine. Upon receipt of each check Sister Francine would endorse
the check to the Order and mail it to a post office box maintained by the
Order.12 Sister Francine retained no control over the funds remitted to the
Order.
83
The Tax Court, in an eleven to seven decision, held that the compen-
sation for Sister Francine's services at the clinic was includible in her own
gross income.8 Relying on Lucas v. Earl,85 the majority found that Sister
Francine had made an invalid assignment of income.8 6 The majority further
found that the assignment of income was invalid, because NHSC formally
hired Sister Francine and paid her directly.8 7 Finally, the majority in Schuster
found that NHSC contracted with Sister Francine for her services and did
not contract with the Order. 88 According to the majority, Sister Francine
received the compensation in her own right and not as agent of the Order,
and, consequently, Sister Francine, not the Order, was taxable on that
income. 9
The Tax Court majority apparently accepted the Commissioner's "tri-
angle theory" of agency.9 The triangle theory of agency requires that for
an agency relationship-to arise for income tax purposes in a case in which
a taxpayer, allegedly acting as agent of a principal, performs services for a
third party, two factors must be present: 1) there must be "some indicium
of an agreement" between the alleged principal and the third party; and 2)
the principal must have the right to direct or control the taxpayer's service or
performance in some meaningful sense. 91
From the standpoint of agency law, the triangle theory is dubious. The
agency relationship is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Agency as
"the fiduciary relationship which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject
to his control, and consent by the other so to act." ' 92 This is precisely the
81. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 767.
82. Id. at 771.
83. Id. at 766-67, 773.
84. Id. at 764-78.
85. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
86. 84 T.C. at 773-78.
87. Id. at 775-78.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 784-85.
91. See id. at 776 (citing Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882 (1982), aff'd mem.,
734 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1984); Vnuk v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1980); Vercio v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1246 (1980). Johnson required inclusion in income by a professional basket-
ball player whose team steadfastly refused to contract with the player's personal services corpora-
tion but rather would contract only with the player himself. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 886. Vnuk
and Vercio both involved the estate trust tax protester scheme. Vnuk, 621 F.2d at 1319-21; Ver-
cio, 73 T.C. at 1259. See supra note 36 (discussing categories of tax protestor schemes).
92. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 1(I) (1957).
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relationship Sister Francine entered into with the Order when she became a
member. Furthermore, Sister Francine's potential status as an employee of
Su Clinica or NHSC does not preclude her from remaining the Order's
agent at the same time.93 The triangle theory requires that the third party
always be aware of and deal directly with the principal. The triangle theory
would, therefore, if taken to its logical conclusion, preclude agency rela-
tionships involving an undisclosed principal. Such a conclusion is patently
at odds with the settled agency law.
94
Even if one accepts the triangle theory as valid, the facts in Schuster
do not support its application. In Schuster the Order informed Su Clinica
of Sister Francine's status and made clear in its letter to the clinic that
Sister Francine was acting as an agent of the Order. The clinic accepted
that arrangement. 9 Sister Francine was, as a matter of economic reality,
an employee of the clinic, even though she was paid through NHSC and
was NHSC's nominal employee, presumably to satisfy its paperwork re-
quirements. 96 NHSC basically was a provider of funds on behalf of the
clinic.
Should one go so far as to accept that NHSC was Sister Francine's
employer, the facts in Schuster still do not support the triangle theory's
application. The Order informed NHSC of Sister Francine's situation
and that she would be "acting on behalf of the Order as its agent."
97
NHSC did not object to this arrangement.98 NHSC at least implicitly
accepted Sister Francine's agency status.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a two
to one decision, affirmed the Tax Court's finding that Sister Francine was
taxable on the amounts in question. 99 The Seventh Circuit, however, ex-
plicitly refused to follow the Tax Court's triangle theory. 13 Rather, the
Seventh Circuit adopted a "flexible test" that requires consideration of
several factors that the majority deemed relevant.' 0' Applying these factors
to Sister Francine's situation, the majority concluded that Sister Francine
93. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 785 (Korner, J., dissenting). An agent can act as principal at
the same time with respect to two principals and to the same responsibilities so long as service
to one principal does not constitute an abandonment of the other. Id.; see REsTATEmENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1957).
94. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 186, 190 (1957) (recognizing efficacy in
certain cases of acts of agent on behalf of undisclosed principal). See Schuster, 84 T.C. at
787 n.3 (Korner, J., dissenting).
95. See supra notes 76-78 (quoting correspondence between clinic and Order in Schuster).
96. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 786 n.2 (Korner, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 783.
98. Id.
99. Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d at 672 (7th Cir. 1986).
100. Id. at 678.
101. Id. The court listed six separate factors adopted in Fogarty v. United States as being
relevant for a determination of whether compensation received by a religious is taxable. Id.
at 677; see Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986); infra text accompanying
note 151 (quoting Fogarty court factors).
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"earned her wages in her individual capacity, rather than as an agent on
behalf of her Order."' 02
A vigorous dissent'0 3 pointed out that, on proper analysis of the undis-
puted facts, the agency factors listed by the majority cut in favor of, rather
than against, Sister Francine's position.'" The Order at all times had
exercised ultimate control over Sister Francine's activities at Su Clinica. The
Order authorized her mission there,' °0 exercised oversight over her activities
there, ' 6 and received Sister Francine's paychecks endorsed to the Order by
her. Sister Francine's vow of obedience required her to be completely
subservient to the will of her superiors. The only plausible way to deny the
Order's control over Sister Francine would be to deny the sincerity of her
VOWS.
Three other recent cases Fogarty v. United States,"7 Hogan v. United
States,"'8 and McEneany v. Commissioner"9 involved priests rather than
nuns." 0 In Fogarty, Father Fogarty was appointed to the position of
associate professor in the Religious Studies Department at the University of
Virginia. The University issued monthly payroll checks payable to Father
Fogarty. He, in conformity with his instructions, deposited the payroll
checks in an account of the Corporation of Roman Catholic Clergymen,
an account of the Jesuit Order. All of the checks payable to Father Fogarty
were turned over to the Order. Father Fogarty exercised no control over the
payroll checks, and the Order, in turn, -provided him with living expenses."
102. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678.
103. Id. at 679 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy remarked in his dissent:
I am sure that Justice Holmes, keeping track of our work at his celestial Lexis
terminal, is appalled to find his much-cited opinion invoked by the government and
the Tax Court to extract taxes from a poverty-pledged nun doing corporal works of
mercy on behalf of a religious community.
Id.
104. Id. at 680-82.
105. See Schuster, 84 T.C. at 783. Sister Francine, in fact, informed NHSC that she
would accept a position only with Su Clinica and not with any other clinic. Id. This was in
conformity with her mission from the Order. Id.
106. See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 682. In Schuster, for example, Sister Francine was under
a duty while on a mission to decline any assignments that conflict with the moral principles
of the Order. Id. In accordance with this duty she informed Su Clinica that she could not
participate in the clinic's artificial birth control activities. Id.
107. Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986), aff'g 6 Cl. Ct. 612 (1984).
108. Hogan v. United States, 57 A.F.T.R.2d 86-338 (D. Me. 1985).
109. McEneany v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,413 (1986).
110. Two of the priests, Father Fogarty and Father Hogan, were members of the Society
of Jesus, popularly known as Jesuits. St. Ignatius Loyola founded the Society of Jesus and
Pope Paul III sanctioned it in 1540. Jesuits lay special emphasis on the vow of obedience,
especially to the Pope. They also stress flexibility, allowing for a great variety of ministries.
Education and scholarship have been the Society's principal work. See 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRrrANNICA 541 (5th ed. 1985). Father McEneany was a member of the Congregation of the
Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary.
111. Fogarty, 780 F.2d at 1007.
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In Hogan, Father Hogan had been a chaplain at a Catholic hospital.
The hospital merged with another hospital and thereby became secular in
nature. A condition of the merger, however, was that the new entity retain
a Catholic chaplain. Father Hogan, accordingly, remained in the position
of chaplain. He received salary checks from the hospital which he turned
over to the Jesuit Order. Father Hogan's duties were essentially the same
both before and after the merger." 2
In McEneany, a state hospital for the mentally disabled requested the
Archdiocese of Los Angeles to provide it with a chaplain to minister to the
spiritual needs of its patients. The Archdiocese in turn requested Father
McEneany's Order to appoint one of its members as chaplain." 3 The Order's
Superior directed Father McEneany to take the position. Father McEneany
endorsed all his paychecks to the Order upon receiving them. Father Mc-
Eneany's duties at the hospital were entirely sacerdotal. He had no secular
duties. Moreover, the hospital administration exercised no control or su-
pervision over him."
4
In each case the court found that the income was taxable to the priests
individually." '5 The Hogan and McEneany courts apparently accepted the
Commissioner's triangle agency theory. For Father Hogan to avoid taxability,
the Hogan court required a showing that the hospital had formally con-
tracted with the Jesuits for his services. No formal contract had been
executed for the two years in question. 1 6 The McEneany court enunciated
a similar requirement and found that Father McEneany had failed to meet
it.,117
In Fogarty, however, the Federal Circuit rejected the triangle theory.
The Fogarty court refused to make a contract between the employer and
the Order a sine qua non of an agency relationship. Rather the court said
that such a contract is only one of several factors to be taken into account
in determining whether an agency relationship exists among the employer,
the religious, and the order." 8 Nevertheless, although the facts in Fogarty
admittedly presented "a very close case" the Federal Circuit refused to
reverse the lower court's decision that Father Fogarty was the taxable
party. "19
112. Hogan, 57 A.F.T.R.2d at 86-338 to 86-339.
113. Id. at 86-1886.
114. Id. In McEneany Father McEneany testified as follows:
They say well we can't tell you how to say mass, and how to give the sacraments,
so we leave that all up to you.
Id.
115. Fogarty, 780 F.2d at 1013; Hogan, 57 A.F.T.R.2d at 86-343; McEneany, 55 T.C.M.
(P-H) 86,413, at 86-1890.
116. Hogan, 57 A.F.T.R.2d at 86-343. Subsequently the hospital and Jesuits did enter into
a formal contract for the provision of Father Hogan's services as chaplain. Id. n.13.
117. McEneany, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86-413, at 86-1890 (1986).
118. Fogarty, 780 F.2d at 1012. See infra text accompanying note 151 (quoting other
relevant factors enumerated by Fogarty court).
119. Fogarty, 780 F.2d at 1013.
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The foregoing cases present a sharp contrast to the mail order church
situation. Moreover, these cases are easily distinguishable from the one case
before the issuance of Revenue Ruling 77-290 that found taxability of a taxpayer
who had taken a bona fide vow of poverty. In Kelley v. Commissioner,
20
the taxpayer was a member of the Dominican Order. However, the taxpayer
had gone on leave from the Order to make a determination about whether
he wished to remain in the Order. The taxpayer obtained a position as a
philosophy professor at a college. The taxpayer received salary checks over
which he retained control, maintained an apartment for himself, purchased
a car in his own name, wore non-clerical garb, and, in general, lived a
secular life.' 2' The taxpayer eventually left the Order permanently.
The Tax Court in Kelley correctly held the taxpayer taxable on this
income, since the taxpayer controlled it entirely. During the period in
question neither the taxpayer nor his salary was in any way controlled by
the Order. 22 This contrasts with Schuster, Fogarty, Hogan, and McEneany
in which the taxpayers continued to live the religious life and abide by their
vow of poverty by relinquishing control over the salaries to their respective
orders. It is difficult, for example, to imagine facts much more compelling
for income exclusion than were present in McEneany.
III. Poe v. Seaborn and Lucas v. Earl: COMPETING ANAL.ooIs
In all the vow of poverty cases both sides have agreed on certain basic
legal principles. First, under Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States,'2
when an agent earns income on behalf of a principal within the scope of
the agency and remits the income to the principal in accordance with the
agency relationship, the income is the principal's and not the agent's.
24
Second, under Lucas v. Earl,125 income is taxable to the person who earns
it, and an anticipatory assignment of that income is not effective to shift
the incidence of taxability.'2 Third, under Poe v. Seaborn, 27 a shifting of
income that occurs by operation of law, such as state community property
laws, will be recognized for federal income tax purposes.'2 Fourth, under
120. 62 T.C. 131 (1974).
121. Id. at 134.
122. A later case, Macior v. Commissioner, presented a similar set of facts. Macior v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) 84-1003 (1984). Although the taxpayer in that case remained
a member of the Order, he essentially abandoned his vow of poverty by maintaining control
over his salary as a University professor of biology. Id. at 84-1004.
123. 251 U.S. 342 (1920).
124. Id. at 347.
125. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
126. Id. at 114-15.
127. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
128. Id. at 110.
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Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey v. Steinhauser,129 a religious order's
ownership rights that arise from Canon Law and a member's vow of poverty
will be enforced by the civil law. 30
The Commissioner has taken the position that the controlling analogy
is Lucas v. Earl. In Earl a husband, by agreement before enactment of
the income tax, assigned a portion of his future income to his wife. The
court held that this agreement was ineffective to shift the husband's income
to the wife for federal income tax purposes.' 3' The Commissioner has argued
that the religious order member who takes a vow of poverty is like the
husband in Earl.32 He is attempting simply to assign his income to the
order. Therefore, absent other factors, such as an actual contract between
the order and a third party employer for the member's services, income
earned on account of those services is taxable to the member individually.
133
Taxpayers have argued that the more appropriate analogy is Poe v.
Seaborn,34 decided only a few months after Earl. In Seaborn the Court
decided that the community property laws of Washington state were effective
to cause income earned entirely by one spouse to be taxed equally to both
spouses. 3 15 The Court attempted to distinguish Earl on the basis that the
very status of marriage operated under the community property law to
prevent the earnings from ever being subject to the earning spouse's con-
trol.136 By contrast, in Earl the wife had a right to the husband's earnings
129. 234 U.S. 640 (1914). See also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871);
Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church, 245 P.2d 481, 487-88
(Cal. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 938 (1953); Canovaro v. Brothers of Order of Hermits of
St. Augustine, 191 A. 140, 146 (1937); Maas v. Sisters of Mercy of Vicksburg, 99 So. 468, 470 (1924).
Sisters of Mercy of Vicksburg, 135 Miss. 505,----, 99 So. 468, 470 (1924).
130. See Steinhauser, 234 U.S. at 648-52 (civil law will enforce religious order's ownership
rights arising from Canon Law and member's vow of poverty when member has voluntary
right of withdrawal from order).
131. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930). The Earl court reasoned that
[t]his case is not to be decided by attenuated subtleties. It turns on the import and
reasonable construction of the taxing act. There is no doubt that the statute could
tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped
by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the
salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That
seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can
be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits
are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
Id.
132. Hogan, 57 A.F.T.R.2d at 86-341.
133. Id. at 86-343.
134. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
135. Id. at 118.
136. Id. at 117. The Seaborn case distinguished Lucas v. Earl on the basis that
[t]he very assignment in that case [Lucas v. Ear] was bottomed on the fact that the
earnings would be the husband's property, else there would have been nothing on
which it could operate. That case presents quite a different question from this,
because here, by law, the earnings are never the property of the husband, but that
of the community.
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because of the husband's voluntary agreement to assign to her a portion of
his income, and not by reason of the status of marriage.
In reality the facts of the two cases are not very different. 37 In both
cases a taxpayer performed a voluntary act. In Earl the act was entering
into the assignment agreement; in Seaborn the act was marrying and living
in the state of Washington. Each act had the effect of giving the taxpayer's
spouse the right to a portion of his income. In each case, the taxpayer
could have avoided the consequence of that act, either by not entering the
assignment agreement or by not marrying or living in a community property
state. To that extent both taxpayers voluntarily had assigned their income.
The Fogarty court attempted to distinguish Seaborn from the vow of
poverty situation on the ground that the Seaborn result depended on the
operation of state community property laws, whereas the vow of poverty is
a voluntary agreement similar to the one entered into by the husband in
Earl."'38 This distinction reflects the Fogarty court's misunderstanding of a
religious vows' function in the Roman Catholic Church. The Catholic
Church, as do other churches, exists under two laws: 1) an ecclesiastical
law that creates and defines the church's internal structure; and 2) civil
law. "'39 In any given instance the civil law may or may not give effect to
the Church's ecclesiastical law internal structure. 40 For example, in an early
case, Order of Saint Benedict of New Jersey v. Steinhauser, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the enforceability of a vow of poverty under
civil law.' 4' However, the Court in Steinhauser enforced the vow as a matter
of civil contract law, not on account of the member's status as a religious
under the ecclesiastical law.
42
In Roman Catholic ecclesiastical law the taking of religious vows results
in a special status as a member of an "Institute of Consecrated Life."',43 In
the eyes of the Catholic Church, the taking of religious vows entails far
more than the mere making of a contract. Taking religious vows involves
entering a special status analogous to entering the married state. 4 The
137. See M. CHmLSTmN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE
LEADiNG CASES AND CONcEPTS 8.01, at 161-62 (4th ed. 1985). In Commissioner v. Harman
Justice Douglas observed in his dissent that the two cases "state competing theories of income
tax liability." Commissioner v. Harman, 323 U.S. 44, 56 (1944) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
138. 780 F.2d at 1009.
139. See Whelan, supra note 19, at 903.
140. See id. at 903-06.
141. Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey v. Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640 (1914). The
Steinhauser case involved the claims of a religious order against the estate of a member who,
in violation of his vow of poverty, had not turned over to the order certain royalty payments
received by him. Id.
142. Id. at 648-52.
143. See generally CODE OF CANON LAw, supra note 18.
144. See, e.g., CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 18, at Canon 607. Canon 607 provides:
Can. 607 § 1 Religious life, as a consecration of the whole person, manifests in the
Church the marvelous marriage established by God as a sign of the world to come.
Religious thus consummate a full gift of themselves as a sacrifice offered to God,
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traditional reference in the Catholic Church to nuns as "Brides of Christ"
illustrates the special status of those who have taken the religious vows of
poverty, chastity, and obedience. The courts in the vow of poverty cases
thus far have rejected the notion of the vows as resulting in a special status
under the civil law. Instead, courts have treated vows of poverty as mere
civil agreements. Indeed, in some instances the courts apparently have
regarded religious vows as less efficacious for civil law purposes than
contracts. 45 This treatment of vows of poverty has led most courts to accept
the Lucas v. Earl analogy rather than that of Poe v. Seaborn.
If on the other hand the courts were to accept the Church's own view
of the vow's effect, the Seaborn analogy would be more appropriate. The
courts are, of course, under no obligation to recognize the Church law in
this matter. In instances regarding internal Church property disputes, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has held that courts should defer to the Church's
own law.1
46
The analogy of the vow of poverty situation to the husband's situation
in Seaborn is powerful if one looks to eccelesiastical law. The parties in
Seaborn voluntarily entered into a status of marriage, from which flowed
certain legal relationships and results. Under the civil law, their income was
shared equally by each of them. They could escape this consequence, but
only by dissolving the status of marriage or moving to a non-community
property jurisdiction. Likewise, when a person takes religious vows that
person enters a status from which certain results flow. These results include,
among other things, that the religious must obey religious superiors, and
that all material goods to which the religious might otherwise become
entitled belong to the religious order. The only way to avoid these results
is to leave the order. The Church considers both marriage and the religious
life to be a status. The Church law defines the status, and as a result of
that status (not any voluntary agreement of the parties) consequent rela-
so that their whole existence becomes a continuous worship of God in charity.
§ 2 A religious [order] is a society in which, in accordance with their own law,
the members pronounce public vows and live a fraternal life in common. The vows
are either perpetual or temporary; if the latter, they are to be renewed when the
time elapses.
§ 3 The public witness which religious are to give to Christ and the Church
involves that separation from the world which is proper to the character and purpose
of each [order].
Id.
145. See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678. In Schuster, for example, the appellate court stressed
that Sister Francine was free under civil law to leave the Order at any time. Id. She was, of
course, not free under ecclesiastical law, and even under civil law, if she did leave, would
have had no right to her earnings up to the time of her withdrawal. See id. at 680-81 (Cudahy,
J., dissenting).
146. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (noted
in 45 FoRDHAm L. REv. 992 (1977)); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)-679 (1872).
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tionships among persons and with respect to property result. If one looks
at Church law, therefore, the Seaborn analogy is more appropriate than
the Earl analogy.
It is true that the Church created the religious status and its results
while the state created the marital status in Seaborn. To this extent Seaborn
and the vow of poverty situation differ. However, the crucial similarity in
both situations is that an institution created a status with consequent results
(the Church in one case and the state in the other), and in each case the
taxpayer entered that status voluntarily. In Seaborn the Court recognized
the special legal relationships consequent to that status for tax purposes. In
the vow of poverty cases the courts thus far have chosen not to recognize
the religious status for tax purposes.
Even if one accepts the application of the Earl analogy, the courts
apparently have been deciding most cases incorrectly on their facts. In
Schuster, for example, the Tax Court applying the Commissioner's dubious
triangle agency theory, and the Seventh Circuit, applying its flexible test,
both basically disregarded the correspondence of the Order's superior
with the clinic and the federal government describing the taxpayer as
the Order's agent.147 The courts also disregarded the control that a religious
order exercises over its members. The Tax Court and the court of appeals
in Schuster both gave short shrift to the undisputed fact that Sister Francine
was obligated under her vow of obedience to refuse to perform certain
duties relating to artificial birth control and did indeed refuse such duties.
48
The Order's control over Sister Francine was certainly greater than the
pseudo-control exercised by the taxpayer's personal service corporation in
cases such as Keller v. Commissioner149 in which the Tax Court, applying
the Earl analogy, has recognized the sole shareholder of a personal service
corporation as the corporation's agent for purposes of determining to whom
income from the shareholder's services was to be taxed.
150
The Court of Appeals in Schuster, although it did not cite Earl, also
misapplied that analogy to the specific facts. Finding the compensation
from the clinic to be taxable to Sister Francine, the Schuster court cited
the following six Fogarty factors as being relevant:
147. See Schuster, 84 T.C. at 783-84 (Korner, J., dissenting); Schuster, 800 F.2d at 682
(Cudahy, J., dissenting); supra notes 76-78 (quoting correspondence between clinic and order
in Schuster).
148. See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 682 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
149. Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), aff'd, 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983).
See, e.g., Fox v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938) (recognizing owner of personal service
corporation as agent of corporation with result that income from owner's services was taxed
to corporation); Laughton v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939), rem'd 113 F.2d 103 (9th
Cir. 1940) (same); Achiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881 (1981) (same); Fatland v. Commis-
sioner, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) 84-489 (1984) (same); Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604 (1982)
(same). In these cases the control by the corporation over its owner was, of course, merely for-
mal, since the corporation was wholly owned by the service performer, a situation far removed
from the relationship of a religious to his or her order.
150. Keller, 77 T.C. at 1032.
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1) the degree of control exercised by the Order over the member;
2) ownership rights between the member and the Order; 3) the
purposes or mission of the Order; 4) the type of work performed
by the member vis-a-vis the purposes or mission; 5) the dealings
between the member and the third-party employer, including the
circumstances surrounding inquiries and interviews, and the control
or supervision exercised by the employer; and 6) the dealings between
the employer and the Order.15" '
As to each of these factors the balance tips to the agency status of
Sister Francine. The Order exercised complete control over Sister Francine
through her vow of obedience. Sister Francine required the Order's permis-
sion and acquiescence to continue performing her mission."2 The Order,
even in civil law, was entitled to any compensation that Sister Francine
received while she was a member of the Order. 3 Sister Francine turned all
of her compensation over to the Order. The work Sister Francine was
performing was precisely within the purposes of the Order to conduct
"hospitals and institutions for the care and treatment of suffering human-
ity."'15 4 In all dealings with the clinic, Sister Francine's real employer, and
the federal government, her employer for payroll purposes, Sister Francine
and the Order made her status as the Order's agent absolutely clear. The
clinic expressly accepted this status and the federal government never rejected
it. 155
Similar facts were present in most of the other cases in which a religious
has been held taxable on income despite a bona fide vow of poverty.
5 6
IV. POLICY REASONS FOR EXCLUSION FROM GROSS INCOME
For most of the federal income tax's history, the Internal Revenue
Service followed a policy of allowing the exclusion from gross income of
compensation paid to members of religious orders who were under a bona
fide vow of poverty." 7 Apparently, the IRS based this policy on the common
sense notion that the work performed by members of religious orders was
basically the charitable work of the orders themselves. Since the orders were
tax exempt, the members performing the order's work also were exempted
from tax.
151. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 677.
152. Id. at 682.
153. Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey v. Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640 (1914).
154. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 681 n.5.
155. Id. at 682 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
156. See, e.g., Fogarty, 55 A.F.T.R.2d 85-416, 6 Cl. Ct. 612 (1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 1005
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Hogan, 57 A.F.T.R.2d 86-338 (D. Me. 1985); MeEneany, 55 T.C.M. (P-H)
86,413 (1986). In a few instances, courts have found religious taxable because they were no
longer living in accordance with their vows of poverty. See Macior v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M.
(P-H) 84,255 (1984); Kelley v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 131 (1974).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 23-35 (discussing Service's vow of poverty policy
prior to Revenue Ruling 77-290); Schuster, 800 F.2d at 679 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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Congress, at the very least, acquiesced in this practice. In fact, in a
separate but related area, Congress expressly enacted an exemption from
taxation. The Internal Revenue Code specifically excludes from the definition
of employment for purposes of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)
taxes, "service performed ... by a member of a religious order in the exer-
cise of duties required by such order. . . ..... This provision was first enacted
in 1950.' 9 The legislative history indicates that the exception applied to "the
performance of services which are ordinarily the duties of . . . members of
religious orders."'' 60 Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress,
in enacting this exemption, intended to restrict the exemption to services per-
formed only directly for the order or the controlling church.16 Although FICA
and the income tax are two separate taxes, at least enough similarity in their
bases indicates a Congressional disposition to provide members of religious
orders with a broad based exemption from taxation.
Moreover, several published rulings of the Service itself basically are
inconsistent with its present position. For example, in Revenue Ruling 74-
581,162 a university law school's faculty members and students who repre-
sented indigents under court appointment as part of the law school's
curriculum were not required to include in gross income amounts received
and turned over to the university on account of their representation.63 The
Service so held, even though in such a situation, the court appoints and the
clients deal with the attorney not the university. In another ruling, a police
officer received compensation from private employment undertaken as an
undercover agent.' 64 The compensation was then turned over to the police
department. The Service held that the compensation was not includible in
the officer's gross income, even though the private employer could not
possibly have been dealing with the police department.
65
158. I.R.C. § 3121(b)(8)(A). An order can, however, elect to have its members be covered
by FICA. I.R.C. § 3121(r). The Treasury regulations elaborate on this statutory exemption as
follows:
... (d) Service in the exercise of duties required by a religious order. Service
performed by a member of a religious order in the exercise of duties required by
such order includes all duties required of the member by the order. The nature or
extent of such service is immaterial so long as it is a service which he is directed or
required to perform by his ecclesiastical superiors.
26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(8)-1(d) (1986).
159. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950. Pub. L. No. 81-734, 64 Stat. 477 (1950).
160. S. REP. No. 1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 138, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 302, 342; see
H.R. REP. No. 1300, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 130 (1949), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 255, 282.
161. See Samson v. United States, 743 F.2d 884, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Friedman, J.,
dissenting).
162. 1974-2 C.B. 25.
163. Id.
164. Rev. Rul. 58-515, 1958-2 C.B. 28.
165. Id. Several other rulings have taken similar positions. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-479,
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None of these rulings have been revoked or modified by the Service. It
is unfair that one set of rules should apply for vow of poverty cases and
another set of rules for all other cases. The Service's present stance, however,
achieves precisely that result. Furthermore, those rules actually have been
changed for religious orders while they have been allowed to remain the
same in other contexts.
Regardless of the government's power to change its administrative
practices with respect to a particular issue,'6 the unfairness of the Service's
abrupt change in the vow of poverty situation is both blatant and patent.
Judge Cudahy, in his dissent to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Schuster
put it most succinctly:
But here the government has nowhere denied that its change of
position was anything but a pusillanimous reaction to the antics of
the tax protest movement. Abuse of the tax system by tax resisters,
who occasionally have recourse to religious disguises, is no good
reason for unfairly changing the rules at the expense of genuine
members of religious orders who have taken solemn vows of pov-
erty.
67
If this is true, the problem becomes one of treating fairly taxpayers who
have taken bona fide vows of poverty, while at the same time screening
out for taxation those who have taken bogus vows.
V. SOME SUGGESTED SOLUTONS
Taxpayers who use bogus vows of poverty as a ruse to avoid paying
taxes should be treated for what they are: frauds. Although the court in
Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States65 indicated a reluctance to
judge the validity of the so-called religion in that case, 69 the first amendment
1976-2 C.B. 20 (physician members of nonprofit foundation formed by hospital's medical
staff, all of whom were required to be members of foundation, were not required to include
in their gross incomes fees from certain patients which they had been required to assign to
foundation); Rev. Rul. 65-282, 1965-2 C.B. 21 (checks for statutory legal fees for representing
indigent persons received by attorneys and immediately turned over to their employer, legal
aid society, not includible in gross incomes of attorneys); Rev. Rul. 58-220, 1958-1 C.B. 26
(checks received by physician and endorsed to hospital of which physician was staff member,
not required to be included in gross income).
166. See Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 343 (1984); Automobile Club of
Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1957).
167. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 680 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
168. 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
169. See id. at 776. The Universal Life Church court expressed the following reluctance to
judge the validity of a religion:
Neither this Court, nor any branch of the Government, will consider the merits or
fallacies of a religion. Nor will the Court compare the beliefs, dogmas, and practices
of a newly organized religion with those of an older, more established religion. Nor
will the Court praise or condemn a religion, however excellent or fanatical or
preposterous it may seem.
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does not protect alleged religions whose members are without sincerity. 70
Certainly, the government is not without power to make appropriate dis-
tinctions in the vow of poverty area based on the sincerity of the taxpayers
alleged beliefs. 7 1 What is more fundamental to the existence of orderly
government than exercise of the taxing power? 72
Although the government has in some cases successfully sought civil or
criminal fraud penalties, thus far the government has pursued primarily
organizers of the fraudulent schemes. 7 3 In the run-of-the-mill bogus vow
of poverty case, the government has eschewed attacking the bona fides of
the vow of poverty, preferring to utilize its agency analysis. 7 4 The unfor-
tunate result of this strategy has been to sweep up the bona fide vows of
poverty along with the bogus ones.
The better resolution would be to return to the pre-Revenue Ruling 77-
290 position, excluding from gross income amounts received by persons
who have taken and actually are complying with bona fide vows of pov-
170. See Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974); Founding Church of
Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1162 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963
(1969); Worthing, Religion and Religious Institutions Under the First Amendment, 7 PEPPER-
DINE L. REv. 313, 351-52 (1980). The Fifth Circuit in Theriault has recognized that
[w]hile it is difficult for the courts to establish precise standards by which the bona
fides of a religion may be judged, such difficulties have proved to be no hindrance
to denials of First Amendment protection to so-called religions which tend to mock
established institutions and are obviously shams and absurdities and whose members
are patently devoid of religious sincerity.
Theriault, 495 F.2d at 395. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in Founding Church of Scientology v.
United States found no protection for secular enterprises disguised as a religious organization:
Any prima facie case made out for religious status is subject to contradiction by a
showing that the beliefs asserted to be religious are not held in good faith by those
asserting them, and that forms of religious organization were erected for the sole
purpose of cloaking a secular enterprise with the legal protections of religion.
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1162 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
171. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). In Yoder the Supreme Court
noted that
[a]lthough a determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice entitled to
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of
ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters
of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.
Id.
172. See Autenreith v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 589 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 379 U.S.
1036 (1970); Muste v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 913, 920 (1961); Mail Order Ministries, supra
note 37, at 974. Cf. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (Court will not strike
down tax legislation on first amendment grounds without "the most critical scrutiny").
173. See, e.g., United States v. Ebner, 782 F.2d 1120, 1122 (2d Cir. 1986); United States
v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, U.S. (1985).
174. See, e.g., Teuscher v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,079 (1985); Slaughter v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,502 (1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1479 (6th Cir. 1984); Wert v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) 84-499 (1984); Brennan v. Commissioner 53 T.C.M. (P-H)
84-500 (1984); Kalgaard v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) 84-283 (1984); Hall v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82-337 (1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1984).
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erty. 75 The questions in each case would be whether the vow of poverty is:
1) bona fide; and 2) actually being followed by the religious order member.
In most instances this standard would weed out the bogus vows and also
those who took bona fide vows but are no longer following them. This
standard would result in an intuitively fairer situation than treating taxpayers
such as Sister Francine and those in Ebner'76 as though their situations were
alike.
A. An Alternative Judicial Approach
In the event the approach suggested above is not followed, an alternative
judicial approach could be utilized. This alternative judicial approach would
continue to allow the individual religious an income exclusion in all cases
in which services are performed directly for the religious order itself.
However, when services are performed for third parties, the individual
religious could exclude payments for those services from income only in
cases when the work performed by the religious is within the scope of the
activities for which the religious order is granted exemption under IRC
section 501(c)(3). Under this alternative judicial approach, the standard is
whether the services performed by the religious would be subject to the
unrelated business income1" tax if the services were performed directly by
the order. The relevant consideration, therefore, becomes whether the serv-
ices performed by the religious are "substantially related to the exercise or
performance by (the order) of its charitable, educational, or other purpose
or function constituting the basis for its exemption."' 178
Under the alternative judicial approach, for example, Sister Francine's
services for the poor at Su Clinica presumably would not be subject to the
unrelated business income tax if the Order owned the clinic and charged a
fee for her services. In Father Fogarty's case the question would be whether
the unrelated business income tax would apply if the Jesuits operated the
school and charged a tuition fee for his classes. The same type of analysis
would apply to Father Hogan's and Father McEneany's duties as hospital
chaplains. In all of these cases, the religious under a bona fide vow of
poverty would be entitled to exclude the compensation from gross income.
In contrast, the religious in Revenue Ruling 77-290 who secured em-
ployment with a private law finn as an attorney would be subject to tax,
because if a religious order operated a private law firm, the order, presum-
ably, would be subject to the unrelated business income tax. Religious orders
are not granted their exemptions to operate private law firms.179 By the
175. See supra text accompanying notes 23-35 (discussing Service's vow of poverty policy
prior to Revenue Ruling 77-290).
176. See Ebner, 782 F.2d at 1122.
177. See I.R.C. §§ 511-15.
178. I.R.C. § 513(a).
179. If the religious acted as an attorney for a legal aid clinic this might be considered
sufficiently related to a charitable purpose (aiding the poor) to come within the scope of the
charitable exemption.
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same token, the religious in Revenue Ruling 84-13180 who operated a private
practice as a psychologist would be taxable on the income from that private
practice.
Admittedly this alternative judicial approach is not perfect, and difficult
cases would remain. 8' This approach, however, is better than the Service's
and Tax Court's triangle agency theory, and the case-by-case agency analysis
that the Federal and Seventh Circuits have undertaken.8 2 The former simply
represents stretching an analysis appropriate to the personal service corpo-
ration situation to fit vows of poverty. The latter case-by-case analysis is
inherently uncertain and, judging by the cases decided thus far, extremely
difficult to apply.
The suggested judicial approach comports with a common sense'83 view
of the situation. Religious orders are granted tax exemptions because they
further certain purposes deemed worthy under the income tax law. When
their members engage in activities that further those worthy purposes, the
exemption also should extend to the members. If the activities are unrelated
to the exempt purposes, the exemption should not apply, just as the
exemption does not apply to the unrelated activities of the orders themselves.
The alternative judicial approach would deal effectively with bogus vows
of poverty, without questioning the sincerity of the taxpayer's religious
beliefs. This approach simply bypasses sensitive first amendment issues. For
example, in McGahen v. Commissioner,"I4 the taxpayer took an alleged vow
of poverty assigning his income to his own chapter of the Basic Bible
Church.' 5 He then continued in his normal occupation as a boilermaker.
The court obviously could have challenged the sincerity of the taxpayer's
beliefs, and there were, in fact, intimations in the opinion that the court
doubted his sincerity. Basing its decision, however, on an agency theory, the
McGahen court noted that "[the income received by him [McGahen] was
180. 1984-1 C.B. 21. In Revenue Ruling 84-13, the religious operated a private psychological
practice in which he treated both laymen and clergy for fees. Id. The Service held him taxable
on these fees on the ground that he was not acting as agent of the Order. Id.
181. For example, would the fees earned by the psychologist in Revenue Ruling 84-13, supra
note 180, for treating clergy be excludible, if such treatment were undertaken under auspices
of the local bishop? This possibly could be construed as within the religious purpose exemption.
182. In a recent bogus vow of poverty case, Mone v. Commissioner, the Second Circuit
apparently applied the triangle agency theory without calling it by that name. Mone v.
Commissioner, 774 F.2d 570, 573 (2d Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit stated that
[t]o prove assignment of income on an agency theory, the taxpayers bear a double
burden: they must show that a contractual relationship existed between their secular
employers and the religious order, and that the religious order controlled or restricted
the taxpayers' use of the money purportedly turned over to the order.
Id.
183. The author is, of course, well aware that application of this standard may be met
with derision in academe.
184. 76 T.C. 470 (1981).
185. Basic Bible Church is a mail order ministry organization controlled by a disbarred
attorney. See United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir. 1985).
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not received on behalf of a separate and distinct principal, but was received
by him in an individual capacity."
' 186
Under the alternative judicial approach suggested here, the court also
would have found the income includible, since working as a boilermaker in
private industry would not be within the exempt purposes of section 501(c)(3).
If a religious order operated a factory employing its members as boiler-
makers, the order would be subject to unrelated business income tax on its
profits from that factory.' 7 The vast majority of bogus vow of poverty
cases would reach the same result under this line of reasoning. Most of the
bona fide vow of poverty cases, however, would result in exclusion from
the individual member's gross income under the suggested approach. This
alternative judicial approach avoids the counter-intuitive result of treating
Sister Francine and the taxpayers in Ebner alike.
B. A Statutory Approach
Legislation also might achieve a satisfactory resolution of the issue. In
Revenue Ruling 76-323 the Service conceded that when a taxpayer under a
valid vow of poverty turned the amounts he received on account of his services
over to his tax exempt Order, he would be entitled to a charitable contri-
bution deduction. 88 This offsetting deduction generally will not result in a
wash, however, because the amount deductible normally will be limited to
50 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 89 The net result,
therefore, is that a religious who turns his entire income over to his tax
exempt order in accordance with a bona fide vow of poverty will be taxed
on half of that income. In several bogus vow of poverty cases, the Service has
successfully disallowed an offsetting deduction in full because the pur-
ported religious order was not qualified to receive deductible contribu-
tions. 190 The most commonly asserted ground for disqualification of the
186. McGahen, 76 T.C. at 479-80.
187. See De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1961)
(unrelated income tax imposed on Christian Brothers' winery operations); Shiloh Youth Revival
Centers v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 29 (1987) (unrelated income tax imposed on income of
Fundamentalist Christian Communal group from forestry, janitorial, and painting activities);
Whelan, supra note 19, at 911-13.
188. 1976-2 C.B. 18, 19. See also Rev. Rul. 77-436, 1977-2 C.B. 25, 26 (religious order
member entitled to charitable contribution for income turned over to tax exempt order).
189. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (generally limiting deduction for charitable contributions
to religious organization to 50% of taxpayer's adjusted gross income).
190. See, e.g., Rager v. Commissioner, 775 F.2d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 1985); Solander v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,161 (1982); Harcourt v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-
H 82-621 (1982); Stephenson v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 995 (1982), aff'd per curiam, 748
F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1984); Pusch v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,004 (1980); Manson
v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,315 (1980); Oakknoll v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (P-
H 78,336 (1978); Church of the Transfiguring Spirit, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1,
5 (1981); People of God Community v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 127, 133 (1980); Southern
Church of Universal Brotherhood Assembled, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1223 (1980);
Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531, 535-36 (1980);
Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 196, 199 (1979), aff'd mere., 631 F.2d 736
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
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"order" is that its net earnings inure to the benefit of a private individual
in contravention of IRC section 170(c)(2)(C).' 9' Thus, the Service and courts
apparently are willing and able to distinguish between bogus and bona fide
situations when the issue is the qualification of the purported religious order
to receive tax deductible charitable contributions.
A statutory resolution of the problem would result if Congress broad-
ened the charitable contribution deduction in appropriate cases. Congress
could enact legislation permitting 100 percent deductibility as charitable
contributions of amounts turned over to qualified tax exempt organizations
by taxpayers in accordance with vows of poverty. The focus in vow of
poverty cases would then shift from the nebulous gross income question to
the more manageable issue of whether the purported religious order is
qualified in fact to receive tax deductible contributions. Under this standard
Sister Francine would include the amounts received for her services in gross
income, but this inclusion would be offset by a corresponding charitable
deduction. 192 The taxpayers in Ebner would not be entitled to an offsetting
charitable contribution deduction. Their "religious order" would be dis-
qualified from receiving deductible contributions because the earnings of
these organizations inure to the benefit of the taxpayers. 19 This standard
would preclude an offsetting deduction in most, if not all, of the bogus vow
of poverty cases.
One objection to this proposal is that Congress in the 1969 Tax Reform
Act repealed a similar provision on the ground that the provision had been
abused. 94 Former IRC section 170(b)(1)(C) (colloquially known as the
Philadelphia nun provision) permitted an unlimited charitable deduction to
a taxpayer if in eight out of the previous ten years the total of the taxpayer's
charitable contributions plus income taxes exceeded 90% of taxable in-
come. 195 This provision reportedly was enacted to meet the special case of
a nun who had inherited trust income in such a form that she was unable
to legally divest herself of the right to that income. 96 Several taxpayers
191. See, e.g., Solander v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,161; Harcourt v. Com-
missioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,621 (1982); Pusch v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,004
(1980). See also § 501(c)(3) (imposing identical non-inurement requirement for organization to
qualify as tax exempt).
192. There would, of course, still be FICA tax consequences since the charitable deduction
would not offset the gross income inclusion for FICA purposes.
193. See United States v. Ebner, 782 F.2d 1120, 1124 (2d Cir. 1986) (while defendants
reported to IRS that they were living under vow of poverty, defendants used church funds to
pay for Cadillacs, ocean front homes, and boats).
194. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487, 551 (1969)
(repealing former IRC § 170(b)(1)(C)); H.R. RFs. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 52 (1969)
[hereinafter H.R. REp. No. 91-413].
195. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C) (as in effect prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969).
196. See 115 CoNo. Rac. 17,22563 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Mills). Representative Mills
made the following remarks to the House of Representatives concerning the Philadelphia nun
provision:
Let me tell you about one case that provides a good example on this point. In
the 1920's-and I know there were two Members here then that are here now, and
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with incomes in excess of $1 million utilized the provision to avoid taxes
on all or most of their income. As a result Congress repealed the Philadel-
phia nun provision. 197
This objection could be overcome by drafting the statute narrowly to
apply only to members of religious orders who turn amounts received by
them over to their order. 198 The exemption from the definition of employ-
ment in IRC section 3121(b)(8)(A) is drawn in similarly narrow terms.199 If




The Service's abrupt change in policy toward bona fide vows of poverty
in Revenue Ruling 77-290 was both unfair and unnecessary. Decades of
settled administrative practice were upset by the Service's "pusillanimous
maybe there are others-a man in Philadelphia died possessed of a great estate. In
the process of dividing it among his children, he left a very sizable amount of money
to a daughter who had become a Catholic nun pledged by her vows not to have
income nor to own property.
The property passed to her in a trust in a form which made it impossible for
her to divest herself of the property. As a result the law was changed in order to
permit her to give all of the income from this property to the church.
So we passed a provision that became known as the unlimited charitable
contribution provision, for her benefit.
Id.
197. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, supra note 194, at 52.
198. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding constitutionality of
religion based exemption from local property tax). To avoid constitutional objections, terms
referring to religion in the statute would have to be construed broadly, so as to comply with
the interpretation of religion in Seeger v. United States. See Seeger v. United States, 388 U.S.
163 (1964).
In Seeger statutory language required conscientious objection to the military draft to be
based upon "religious training and belief" defined as "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173.
The court held that a meaningful belief occupying the position of God fulfilled this requirement.
Id. at 173-80. To confine the term religion only to those religions encompassing theistic
beliefs probably would render the statute unconsitutional. See generally Friediund, Constitu-
tional Issues in Revoking Religious Tax Exemptions: Church of Scientology of California v.
Commissioner, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 565 (1985); Freeman, The Misguided Search for the
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 71 GEo. L. J. 1519 (1983); Worthing, supra note 170,
at 313; Comment, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056
(1978); Whelan, supra note 19, at 885; Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When
Should the Church Render Unto Caesar?, 29 U. FsA. L. REv. 50 (1976).
199. See I.R.C. § 3121(b)(8)(A). Section 3121(b)(8)(A) excludes inter alia from the defi-
nition of employment for purposes of FICA:
service performed by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church
in the exercise of his ministry or by a member of a religious order in the exercise
of duties required by such order ....
Id.
200. Of course the potential for abuse of any special income tax provision can never be
completely eliminated.
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reaction ' 20 1 to bogus vows of poverty. Judicial and legislative approaches
can and should be devised to separate for tax purposes the bona fide from
the bogus vow of poverty. The tax laws can and should separate the wheat
from the chaff.
20 2
201. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 680 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
202. See Matthew 3:12 (Revised Standard Version) ("His winnowing fork is in his hand,
and he will clear his threshing floor and gather his wheat into the granary, but the chaff he
will burn with unquenchable fire.").
